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STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an action alleging violation of a restrictive
covenant applicable to real property and seeking alternatively
injunctive relief and damages.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
This appeal is taken from a decision of the Third
Judicial District Court of Salt Lake County, the Honorable
Dean E. Conder presiding, granting Defendants-Respondents'
motion for summary judgment on the separate and individually
sufficient grounds that (1) Plaintiff-Appellant lacks standing
to sue for the enforcement of the subject restrictive covenant,
and (2) Plaintiff-Appellant is barred from suing to enforce the
subject restrictive covenant by the doctrine of collateral
estoppel.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
In July of 1976 defendants Robert and Nancy Miller
(hereinafter "Millers") purchased a lot upon which they intended
to build their home.

The lot is located at 925 Little Valley

Road which is located in the upper "Avenues" area of Salt Lake
City---at approximately the 18th Avenue level.

Shortly there-

after the Millers contracted with the defendant The Art Company,
and its owner and president J. Blair Jones (hereinafter collectively ''Jo11es"), to construct a home on the lot.
nurinq the latter part of 1976, and after construction
11um 0~

i 1C1d

been commenced, the Millers were confronted by

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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three future neighbors, Gerald F. Carvalho, Sh' 1
l r ey B. He··
'•.
and Plaintiff-Appellant Piero G. Ruffinengo (hereinafter
"Appellant"), who contended that the Millers' home, as de,
and being constructed, would violate restrictive covenant,
applicable to the lot.

(R. 72, 76).

After reviewing alt::·

natives to the planned construction in an attempt to aliay.
stated concerns of these neighbors, it was decided by the
Millers that the planned construction did not violate the
restrictive covenants and that construction would proceed:.
planned with the exception of the removal of a balcony and
change of a bedroom window in cons idera ti on of privacy cor:.)
of the Herzbergs.

(R.

78).

This decision was

communica~e'

writing by letter addressed jointly to Dr. and Mrs. Herzbe:
Dr. and Mrs. Carvalho and Appellant and dated January 10,
1977.

(R.

77, 78).

On January 14, 1977, Dr. Carvalho and Dr. Herzbi:
filed an action against defendants in the Third Judicial
District Court, Civil No. 239493

(hereinafter "Suit l"),

alleging a violation of the applicable restrictive covena:
dealing with height limitations

(R.

20-25, 77), and spec!'.

ally claiming that construction would impair their privac;.
view, access to light and air and property value (R. 22 1·
Plaintiffs in Suit l prayed for a temporary restraining or:
and for preliminary and permanent injunctions (R. 221 ·
On January 18, 1977, Millers were
copy of the complaint and summons, together

S erved

with;

with a tempc:-
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restraining order enjoining further construction of their home.
On January 26, 1977, a hearing on the Suit 1 motion
for preliminary injunction was held before the Honorable James
Sawaya (R. 26, 29).

During the course of this hearing, and

due to the extensive evidence which was being introduced, it
was suggested by the court, and stipulated to by the parties,
that this hearing would constitute a final hearing and trial
on the merits.

(R. 26, 29).

(It should be noted that at

the time of trial in Suit 1 the external frame of the Millers'
home was fully in place.

(R. 74) .) Following a day-long

trial the matter was taken under advisement by Judge Sawaya.
On January 31, Judge Sawaya, by minute entry, found
~

favor of the defendants and against the plaintiffs.

(R. 85).

On February 14, 1977, Judge Sawaya entered judgment
for defendants, denying plaintiffs' motion for preliminary
injunction, dismissing plaintiffs' complaint with prejudice,
specificially finding that "both the proposed construction
as reflected by the building plans and the actual construction
of the dwelling being constructed by defendants are in conformity with the applicable restrictive covenants" and ruling as
a matter of law that "there is no material violation of existing restrictive covenants or building codes by either the
proposed construction as reflected by the building plans or
the actual construction" of the Millers' home.

(R. 26-29) .

On February 15, 1977, Appellant filed a complaint
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against Millers in the instant action (herei'n f

a ter "Su:

again in the Third Judicial District Court

'

and

.

•

violation of the same restrictive covenant and

again ,

. .

c 1a1m1r.:

alia decrease in property value, invasion of
·
privacy,
;
of access to light, air and view and seeking · ·
lnJunct1ve
or, in the alternative, damages.

(R.

r.

2-11).

On the same day (February 15) , plaintiffs in _
2
filed a motion for new trial, which motion was argued or
February 25 and denied by Judge Sawaya on March 4.
On March 11, 1977, defendants herein filed the::
answer setting forth their defenses to the allegations cc·,
within the Suit 2 complaint and raising th<; affirmative:::,
collateral estoppel and res judicata, attaching thereto
ceri~ified

copies of the Suit 1 complaint, the court's Fi:.'..

and Conclusions and the Order and Judgment.

(R. 15-29).

On May 16, defendants filed a motion for surnmar;·
judgment on the grounds that Appellant is barred from re;;: ..
ing the issue of the Millers' home's compliance with the
restrictive covenant by the doctrine of res judicata and
because Appellant has no standing to enforce the restric~i
covenant in question.

(R. 40).

This motion was argued

the Honorable Dean E. Conder on June 3.

( R.

91) .

cc:·

Defe;,i:!;::

motion was granted, and the Order and JudgrneP.t dismissir.a
Appellant's complaint with prejudice was entered on Jur.e ;,
(R.

87).
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On June 16, Appellant petitioned the Third Judicial
District court for rehearing of defendants' motion for summary
1uagment.

(R.

95,

96).

Such rehearing was granted and argued

tc Judge Conder on June 22, following which Judge Conder again
granted defendants' motion for summary judgment on the bases
~at

(1) Appellant has no standing to enforce the restrictive

covenant, and (2)

that Appellant is barred from relitigating

the issue of the compliance of the Millers' home with the
applicable restrictive covenant by the doctrine of collateral
estoppel (R. 120).

An Order and Judgment to this effect was

entered by Judge Conder on June 2 7.

(R. 120).

It is from

this Order and Judgment that Appellant now appeals .
. Since the entry of the Order and Judgment the
~llers'

home has been completed and the Millers are

~ow

occupying it as their residence.
The restrictive covenant in question unquestionably
applies to the lot upon which the Millers have built their
home (R. 10, 11, 23, 24).

The pertinent portion of this

covenant deals with height limitations, and states:
"USE OF LAND" Each lot in said subdivision is
hereby designated as a residential lot, and none of
the said lots shall be improved, used or occupied
for other than private, single family residence
purposes, and no flat or apartment house shall be
erected thereon, and no structure shall be erected
or placed on any of said lots other than a one, two
or three car garage not exceeding one story in height,
and one single family dwelling not to exceed one
-5-
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story in height; except, that on those lots h
the finished ground elevation is at least 0 w ere
f
ne
.
story 1 ower on one side o
the dwelling than
the opposite side, the dwelling may extend tw!E:.
stories above the finished ground elevation 0
such lower surface."
(emphasis added) (R. 1~ 23 ).

'*

Alleged violations by the Millers' home of the at:
quoted height restrictions have formed the basis for plain:.
complaint in Suit 1

(R. 20-25) and for Appellant's rnultifar:

causes of action in Suit 2,

(R. 2-11), and it was with the;;

height limitations that Judge Sawaya specifically found tha:
the Millers' home complied.

(R. 26-29)

.'!:../

This height

restriction is contained within the terms of a document
entitled "Res+-rictive Agreement" and which was attached to
Appellant's
11,

24,

25).

(as well as Suit 1 plaintiffs') complaint (R.:
Examination of this document reveals that it

was recorded by the Northc? est Investment Corporation, Jarr,e,
*/While the issue of the compliance of the Millers'
home with this covenant is not before the Court on this
appeal, it should be noted that Appellant's brief in sever;.
instances states that the Millers' home is three stories
high.
See e.g. Appellant's Brief at 1, 3. This isatota 1
misrepresentation.
Since such statements are irrelevant tc
any issue before the Court on appeal, it is assumed that
they are injected to influence the Court's sense of equity.
The Court should be aware, however, that the Millers' Mme'
completed is not "three stories" at any point. Only if P
include the basement, which is totally below ground level
·th thte'
with no exposure of outer walls, can you come up wi
·
levels.
Certainly the covenant did not intend that the ..
basement be included in determining number of stories sir.c.
·
·
· h t l'imitation,
·
·
it
is
a h eig
not a space l 1'rni· tati'on · .That
.....
1
was the apparent conclusion of the plaintiffs in Suit '.~:
"th constructk
alleged that the Millers' home called for
e
of a structure two stories high" (R. 21), and of Judge .
Sawaya who found that the Millers' home did nor violate .:
two story restriction.
(R. 27)
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B. Cunningham, President, and was to encumber all lots of
the Northcrest Subdivision, Plat "F".

The lot which the

Millers purchased is lot 5 of this Northcrest Subdivision,
Plat "F" ·

(R.

27).

Appellant's home is situated below and to the
southwest of the Millers' home, and the two lots share a
boundary which is to the rear of both homes.

Appellant's

home is not in Plat "F", but rather is in Plat "E"

(R. 2).

The Northcrest Subdivision Plat "E" was developed
by Northcrest Manor, Inc.

(hereinafter "Northcrest Manor").

The Northcrest Subdivision Plat "F" was developed by the
Northcrest Investment Corporation (hereinafter "Northcrest
Investment").

Subsequent to the development of Plat "E",

all of the outstanding shares of stock in Northcrest Manor
were purchased by James B. Cunningham and Phenix Investment,
Inc. (hereinafter "Phenix"), a corporation partially owned
by Mr. Cunningham.

(R. 89).

Prior to this time Mr. Cunningham

had had no involvement with Northcrest Manor and had not
personally participated in and/or owned an interest in the
development of Plat "E".

(R. 79).

Immediately upon acquisition

by Phenix of Northcrest Manor stock, Northcrest Manor was
dissolved and transferred all of its land holdings to Cunningham and Phenix.

Apparently because the document of conveyance

(which is not part of the record) recited "$10 and other
good and valuable consideration," Appellant assumes that
-7Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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this was the actual amJunt of consideration given
shares of stock in Northcrest Manor.
was in fact given

for the

Of course, far uore

(some $500,000).

On March 5, 1965, Phenix conveyed by warr

t
an y de'

(a certified copy of which was submitted to the court at ::
time of the rehearing on defendants' motion for

surmnary i'J::

and which is now attached hereto as Exhibit "A") that reai
property now constituting Plat "F" to Northcrest Investrnec:
Corporation.

Again Appellant argues that this sale was mo:·

for $10 and again this conclusion is absurd (in fact for"
$130,000).

At the time of this transfer from Phenix to Nort:·
crest InVt'!.stment, title to Plat "F" was not encumbered by,.
restrictive covenant.

(R. 79 and Exhibit A).

I t was not~

August 21, 1967, that Mr. Cunningham, as president of lloru
Investment, and in conjunction with the recording of the P:.

"F" Subdivision plat, recL'rded the Restrictive Agreement

i:

the office of the Salt Lake County Recorder, thereb'f subJec
each lot thereafter sold in Plat "F" to reciprocal restri~:
covenants.

(R. 79).

The stated purpose and intent of the

covenant regarding height limitations was to protect the
·
1 t "F" on the
of the Salt Lake Valley for those lots in
P.a

uphill side of the property.

(R.

79, 80).

-8-
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POINT I
PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT LACKS STANDING TO SUE FOR THE
ENFORCEMENT OF A RESTRICTIVE COVENANT TO WHICH
NEITHER HE NOR HIS PREDECESSORS IN INTEREST WERE
PARTIES AND WHICH WAS NOT INTENDED TO BENEFIT HIS LOT
Appellant founds the various aspects of his basic
clitim upon the language of a contract de:-.ominated "Restrictive
Agreement."

By its terms, this contract is between the North-

crest Investment Corporation, by its president James B.
Cunningham, and the purchasers and their successors of the
lots located within the Northcrest Subdivision Plat "F".

In

its introductory paragraph the contract provides:
"THAT, WHEREAS, NORTHCREST INVESTMENT CORPORATION,
is the owner of Northcrest Subdivision, Plat "F",
situated in Salt Lake County, State of Utah, and it
desires and intends to sell and convey the same to
purchasers for the purposes herein contemplated, and
in order to restrict the use of said property and
thereby enhance the value thereof, it hereby agrees
with all who shall purchase said property, or any
part thereof, that in consideration of such purchase
and use thereof, said property shall be and is
restricted in the following respects ... " (emphasis
added)
(R. 10, 24).

In point of fact, Appellant is neither a party to
this contract nor a successor in interest to a party to this
contract.

Under these circumstances Appellant has no standing

~sue to enforce the restrictions upon Millers'

lot which are

contained within the contract.
The contract in question is generally termed a
restrictive covenant (or negative easement) and was placed upon

~rd rn:,Jp app l tca.ble to all lots within Plat "F" by the plat' s
-9-
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developer, Northcrest Investment Corporation

' as Part of '

general plan of subdivision and development of Plat "F".
other words, as part of the sale and purchase of the lots .
Plat "F"

I

the Northcrest Investment Corporation exo . '

.•cte1..1 a

1

promise from all purchasers of these lots that they
by the terms of the

res~rictive

agreement.

would;:

Th ese promises

reciprocal in nature in that both the burdens and the bene:.
arising therefrom run to and from all purchasers of Plat,,,
lots.

The.c;e promises not only bind original lot owner:;, b::

also "their heirs, successors and assigns"

(R. 11)---those

in privity of estate with the original purchasers.
The threshhold issue raised by Appellant in this
appeal is the question of who may sue to enforce the heigh:
limitations of this restrictive covenant which unquestionac
burdens as well as benefits Millers' Lot 5 of Plat "F". t
general rule was set forth by the court in the leading ca;;
of Korn v. Campbell, 192 N.Y. 490, 85 N.E. 687 (1908),
wherein the court was considering a gene·cal scheme for the
improvement of real property under which an owner of a lat;
plot or tract of land divided i t into building lots to be
sold to different purchasers for separaf-e occupancy, by de:
containing uniform covenants restricting the use which tie
several grantees could make of their property.

Regarding

the question of who may sue for the enforcement of such
uniform covenants the court stated:
-10Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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"In such case the covenant is enforceable by
any grantee as against any other, upon the theory
that there is a mutuality of covenant and consideration, which binds each, and gives to each the
appropriate remedy.
Such covenants are entered into
by the grantees for their mutual protection and
benefit, and the consideration therefor lies in the
fact that the diminution in the value of a lot.
burdened with restrictions is partly or wholly offset by the enforcement in its value due to similar
restrictions upon all the other lots in the same
tract."
This same approach toward enforcement was adopted by
~is

court in the case of Hayes v. Gibbs, 110 Utah 54, 169 P.2d

781 (1946) wherein the Court, citing Korn v. Campbell with

approval, held that:
"The cases appear to be unanimous in supporting
the proposition that if a general scheme for building
or development is intended by the original granter,
subsequent grantees may bring action against each
other to enforce the restrictive covenant."
Appellant relies primarily upon Hayes v. Gibbs for
his argument that he has standing claiming that both he and the
Millers are grantees.

However, such reliance is misplaced

due to the fact that, while both Appellant and Millers own lots
which are encumbered by similar restrictive covenants, the
promises which run up and down their respective chains of
tit-le emanate from different granters.
Hayes v. Gibbs, supra, involved a factual situation
very similar to the instant action except for a very critical
distinction.

Hayes sued Gibbs to enforce a restrictive covenant

which prohibited the use of lots within the subdivision for
-ll'"i
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business purposes.

Both Hayes and Gibbs had pur h
c ased pre:

erties through a chain of title going back to a Hubbard
Investment Company which in turn had acquired th

e propert:

from the original subdivider, Douglas Heights Land and Ir.';'
Company.

All conveyances in this chain of title contained

restrictive covenants applying to the lots ultimately 0 ~~
by Hayes and Gibbs, including the conveyance from Douglas
Heights to Hubbard Investment.
As a precondition to the enforcement of the cow:·
by Hayes as against Gibbs the court reviewed the chain of:.
to assure that the particular covenant was applicable to'.:'
property of both parties, that is, that the parties were tc
successors in interest to or in privity of estab" with a
conunon grantor who made the properties subject to the same
covenant.

The court noted:

"The title to the specific property in
issue •.. comes from the Douglas Heights Land and
Improvement Company to Hubbard Investment Company
via a conveyance containing restrictive covenants
applying to both Hayes and Gibbs."
The primary consideration, the court reasoned,·.:
the intent of the common grantor as manifested by the appi:
tion by this common grantor of the restrictive covenant :c
land eventually acquired by both the party seeking to enic:
the covenant and the party against whom enforcement was sa:
In Hayes v. Gibbs, both parties were successor:·
interest to a common grantor which intended that both o::
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properties be subject to the restrictive covenant and which
had manifested this intent by exacting promises from the
original grantee, thereby binding all successive grantees to
reciprocal rights and duties.

Herein lies the critical

distinction which reveals the error of Appellant's reliance
C1pon Hayes v. Gibbs.
As set forth in our Statement of Facts, Appellant's
lot is in Plat "E" of the Northcrest Sub<'livision.

This Plat,

along with Plats "A", "B", "C" and "D," were developed, subdivided and sold by Northcrest Manor, Inc.
~mpletion

FollowincJ the

of Plat "E", all of the outstanding shares of stock

in Northcrest Manor, and thereby all its real property assets,
were acquired by James B. Cunningham and Phenix Investment,
Inc.

Neither Mr. Cunnningham nor Phenix had participated

and/or owned any interest in the development of Plat "E".
Northcrest Manor was then immediately dissolved, its real
property assets passing to Mr. Cunningham .:ind Phenix as if
directly acquired.

A portion of this real property (including

that which was to become Plat "F") was then conveyed to
Northcrest Investment Corporation, this last transfer occurring
in March of 1965.

None of the documents of conveyance frnm

Northcrest Manor to Cunningham and Phenix and then to Northcrest
Investment contained any restrictive covenants and in fact

~here were no such encumbrances on the title eventually held
by Northcrest Investment.

It was not until August 21, 1967,
-13-
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the date upon which Mr. Cunningham recorded his

proposed

Plat "F", that the restrictive covenant sought to
herein was spawned.

be enfor:,

This covenant, by its terms, applies

to Plat "F" and runs between Northcrest Investment and aj
purchasers of lots within Plat "F" , inc 1 uding the Millers'
Lot 5.

It does not run to Plat "E".
In contrast to Hayes and Gibbs, Appellant and

Millers are not successors in interest to a common grantor
which made the restrictive covenant applicable to both of
their lots.

The restrictive covenant applicable to Appelio

lot can be traced back to Northcrest Manor, the developer
of Plat "E" in which Appellant owns Lot 14.

The restrictr.

covenant applicable to Millers' lot can be traced back on:
to Northcrest Investment Corporation which developed Plat
"F" and had no interest in the development of Plat "E".
Therefore, while both Appellant and Millers can trace titi'
back to a common gr an tor, they cannot trace their respectl .
restrictive covenants back to a common grantor.

Under the

prerequisites set forth in Hayes v. Gibbs, this defect i 5
fatal to Appellant's argument.
Appellant attempts to evade this obstacle by cc:·
ing that the transfers of title to the property which eve:·'
became Plat "F" were for "nominal consideration" and "occ~::
for tax reasons", suggesting that only the name of the er.:
holding title changed.

This argument not only does not·.:
-14-
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a scintilla of evidentiary support in the record, but is
patently absurd.
~either

To begin with, there is no question but that

Mr. Cunningham, Phenix nor Northcrest Investment

owned any interest in Northcrest Manor during the period
while it was developing Plat "E", or for that matter Plats
"A", "B", "C" or "D".

To then suggest that, because recorded

documents of conveyance recite "$10 and other good and valuable consideration," only nominal consideration was paid to
acquire considerable acreage
1965 is nonsense.

in the upper Avenues area in

Lastly, to state that "Northcrest Invest-

ment de facto stepped into the shoes of Northcrest Manor
and retained all of its duties and obligations"
Brief at 36) has no basis in fact or in law.

(Appellant's

The only way

that Northcrest Manor could bind any successors in title to
covenants restricting the use of the property conveyed would
be to make the conveyances of title subject to such restrictions.
See Hayes v. Gibbs, supra.

This did not occur.

Appellant also argues that the language of the
restrictive covenant expressly gives him the right to sue to
enforce it.

However, juxtaposing the two pertinent provisions

of the agreement reveals a different result.
"THAT, WHEREAS, NORTHCREST INVESTMENT CORPORATION, is the owner of Northcrest Subdivision, Plat
"F", situated in Salt Lake County, State of Utah,
and it desires and intends to sell and convey the
same to purchasers for the purposes herein contemplated, and in order to restrict the use of said

-15-
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pro~erty and thereby enhance the value thereof it
hereby agrees with all who shall purchase said,
property, or any part thereof, that in consi'd
.
f
h
.
eratio1
ob sudc . purchas~ andd :ise therfeof, said property shaJ:
e an is restricte in the allowing respects
·
and the owner or owners of any of the lots in : · :d
subdivision shall have the right to sue for an~
obtain an injunction prohibitive or mandatory to
prevent the breach of or to enforce the observan
of the restrictions above set forth ... "
~

Appellant argues that the phrases "said propert,·
and "said subdivision" include all plats within the area
generally described as the Northcrest Subdivision.

~w~e

in view of the fact that Northcrest Investment owned only
Plat "F", never had any interest or participation in the
development of other plats in -::he Northcrest Subdivision,:.
only sell to purchasers of Plat "F" lots, and could only
exact covenants from purchasers of Plat "F" lots, it is
clear that "said property" refers only to Plat "F" and thl:
only the owner or owners of any of the lots in Plat "F" ht'
the right to sue to enforce the covenants.

Appellant is

r.·

one of those owners.
POINT II
THE DOCTRINE OF EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL CANNOT AND
DOES NOT APPLY TO DEFENDANTS-RESPONDENTS
Appellant, apparently recognizing the weakness::
"simple name change" theory (See Point I, supra), argues::
Respondents should be barred from claiming that Northcres:
•

b•

Manor and Northcrest Investment are not the same entity '
doctrine of equitable estoppel, citing Kelly v.
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Ri~·

95 Utah 560,

83 P.2d 731 (1938).

As set forth by Appellant,

this doctrine requires concealment of material facts, with
knowledge of the facts, with the intention to mislead, which
does in fact mislead.

However, here is where Respondents'

concurrence ends.
First there is no evidence in the record which
would support this claim.

Secondly, since Appellant purchased

his lot in a chain of title from Northcrest Manor, and not from
Northcrest Investment, it is difficult if not impossible to
see how Northcrest Investment could be in a position wherein
Appellant was relying upon anything it did or said, let alone
how the Millers could be involved in such a conspiracy.
POINT III
THE LOWER COURT PROPERLY APPLIED THE DOCTRINE OF
COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL IN GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT
TO DEFENDANTS-RESPONDENTS IN THIS CASE
In the fall of 1976, the defendants Robert and Nancy
Miller began constructing their new home at 925 Little Valley
Road.

By December the Millers had received some complaints

about the plans from three neighbors who lived in close proximity to the house.

On January 14, 1977, two of the three

neighbors brought suit to enjoin the construction of the Millers'
house on the ground, inter alia, that it violated the restrictive
covenant's height provisions.

On January 26, 1977, the parties

had a full trial of the issues, and on February 14, 1977, Judge
Sawaya entered judgment for the defendants, finding
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I
.

"[t] hat the evidence shows that both the pro
.
.
pos~
construction dS reflected by the building plans .
the actual construction of the dwelling bein
and
structed by defendants are in conformity wit~ ~~~
applicable restrictive covenants and building code."
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, Civil No. 2
(attached to Answer).

3949

]

The very day after judgment was

entered in Suit 1, the third complaining neighbor filed
this action alleging the same breaches of the same restric:.
covenants by the same defendants.
The doctrine of collateral estoppel bars parties
and their privies from relitigating issues which have beer.
determined in a prior suit where the issues were actually
litigated and necessary to the judgment in the prior sult.
In re Town of West Jordan, 7 Utah 2d 391, 326 P.2d 105
(1958).

There is no question that Appellant in this case

seeks to relitigate the issue of the compliance of the
Mil ers' house with the restrictive covenant.

There is no

question that Appellant's complaint states no cause of
action unless that issue is allowed to be relitigated. L
issue on appeal is whether Appellant should be collaterali
es topped by the decision in Suit 1 that the house con,plie;
with the restrictive covenant.

That issue in turn is

solely dependent on the question of whether Appellant is

-18-
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one who is in privity with plaintiffs in Suit l.~
The concept of privity, as applied to determine the
binding effect of judgments, has been defined in a variety of ways.
some courts have applied the narrow notion of "privity of estate",
holding that a privy is one who has a mutual or successive interest
to the same property.

See, e.g. National Lead Co. v. Nilsen,

131 F.2d 51 (8th Cir.), ~· denied, 318 U.S. 758 (1943).

Many

other courts have recognized that a broader definition of privity

is appropriate in many cases.

The law has been summarized as

follows:
With respect to the application of the doctrine
of res judicata to those in privity with parties to
a suit, there is no generally prevailing definition of
"privity" which can be automatically applied to all
cases, and the determination of who are privies requires careful examination into the circumstances of
each case as it arises.
According to many decisions,
privity means a mutual or successive relationship to
the same rights of property, or such an identification
in interest of one person with another as to represent
the same legal rights; and the term "privy" when applied
to a judgment or decree refers to one whose interest
has been legally represented at the trial.

!/The doctrine of res judicata bars.a second suit,
between parties or their privies, on the same cause of action as
a former suit which was resolved on the merits. See In re Town
of West Jordan, 7 Utah 2d 391, 326 P. 2d 105 (1958-)-.- Since Appellant's es sen ti al cause of action in Suit 2 is the same as the
plaintiffs' claim in Suit 1, the doctrine of res judicata should
also apply to bar this suit if Appellant is in privity with
the former plain tiffs.
-19-
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-.....'
'

50 C.J.S. Judgments § 788, at 324-25

(emphasis added). :.

statement indicates privity can be found to exist

d

, un er:·

circumstances, where an identical interest or right lias t,.
represented in litigation.
The California Supreme Court decision of Zar

~

Craven, 33 Cal. 2d 315, 202 P.2d 73

(1949), illustra~s~

application of the broad definition of privity.

Th e cour:

1

the general rule "that such privity involves a person so
identified in interest with another that he represents tht
legal right."

202 P.2d at 75, quoting 30 Am. Jur. at95l.

particular legal right in that case was the right to reco'"i
injuries to both husband and wife arising out of an auto[c:
accident.

Under California law, a recovery for th1; injur:

either would be a recovery of community property.

The hu;:.

sued the defendant first and was denied recovery.

The wi'.:

barred from bringing a suit to recover for her personal ir. J
because she was in privi ty with her husband.

The court rd

there was but one legal right, to recover community prope::I
that right "depend[ed]

in both cases on negligence of the·:J

and lack of contributory negligence on the part of the hus:•
in relation to one accident."

202 P.2d at 75.

While the '.I

in Zaragosa is based on community property concepts,

th .. i
e ''
l"I

is applicable in other situations where a single corrunon ''
is being asserted.

See also State Farm nutual Auto~

Salazar, 155 Cal. App. 2d 861, 1318 P.2d 210 (19571 (insur:
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company in privity with insured where it seeks to raise only
subrogated rights of insured).
California is not alone in adopti1tg a broad concept
of privity for purposes of res judicata and collateral estoppel.
Many other courts and cases have recognized the broad definition
of privity.~/

For example, the doctrine of representation, one

form of pri vi ty, has long been recognized in courts
of equity.

As the Illinois Supreme Court stated in 1946:

It is unquestionably the rule that in equity
the interests of parties not before the court will
not be bound by the decree.
This rule, however, is
subject to the well-recognized exception growing
out of convenience and necessity in the administration
of :justice, out of which what is known as the doctrine
of representation arose.
Under this doctrin~, where
it appears that parties, although not before the court
in person, are so represented by others who are before
the court that their interests will receive actual and
efficient protection, the decree may be held to be

*/See, e.g., Jefferson Schuol of Social Science v.
Subversive Activities Control Bd., 331 F.2d 76 (D.C. Cir.
1963); Mixon v. Barton Lumber and Brick Co., 226 Ark. 809,
295 S.W.2d 325 (1956); Smith v. City of Los Angeles, 190
Cal. App. 2d 112, 11 Cal. Rptr. 898 (1961); Hudson v. Western
Oil Fields, Inc., 150 Colo. 456, 374 P. 2d 403 (1962); Smith
v. Wood, 115 Ga. App. 265, 154 S.E.2d 646 (1967); Bryntesen
v. Carroll Constr. Co., 26 Ill. App. 2d 307, 167 N.E.2d 581
(1960; Weinberg v. Werft, 309 Ky. 731, 218 S.W.2d 398 (1949);
Margo-Kraft Distributors, Inc. v. Minneapolis Gas Co., 294
Minn. 274, 200 N.W.2d 45 (1972); Hentschel v. Smith, 278
Minn. 86, 153 N.W.2d 199 (1967); Drainage Dist. No. 1 v.
Matthews, 361 Mo. 286, 234 S.W.2d 567 (1950); Hudson Transit
Corp. v. Antonucci, 137 N.J. Law 704, 61 A.2d 180 (1948);
Gable v. Raftery, 65 N.Y.S.2d 513 (1945); Queen City Coach
Co. v. Burrell, 241 N.C. 432, 85 S.E.2d 688 (1955); First
Nat'l Bank of Greenville v. united States Fidelity and
Guarantee Co., 207 S.C. 15, 35 S.E.2d 47 (1945); Gentry v.
:arruggia, 132 W. Va. 865, 53 S.E.2d 741 (1949); See generally
)O ~_:_-I_2.:_ Judgments § 788, at 325 nn. 62-63.
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binding upon such absent parties.
In such c aseo. .
m1:1st a~pear that the ~bsent parties star.ct in the;.-.
situation as the parties before the court, and t'~>
they have a common right or interest with the ~·.:
operation and protection of which will be form~, .. ,
common benefit of all and cannot be to the inj~~~ .•
any.
In order to apply this doctrine, there mu"t:
persons who are parties to the suit who, with
enc;:e to th~ interests in qu,, st ion, are equally c;;:
tain to bring forward the entire merits of the
questions involved in order that the object for., ..
the presence of the actual owner is ordinarily ···
required may be satisfied.

r:.,::

State Life Ins. Co. v.
2d 5 2 5 ' 5 2 9
,, 0.411(1]

( 19 4 6) .

Board of Education, 394 Ill. 30:,

See also lB Moore's Federal Pract:c:

(1965); Restatement of Judgments §§ 83, 85-S:

In Commercial Trust Co. v. Kohl, 140 N.J. Eq. 294,

54~....

(1947), the New Jersey court applied this broad privity

concept to issues determined concerning a will where ::.2
interests of unborn beneficiaries "were identical to the
interests of the contingent corporate beneficiaries wtc
presented to the court the facts and arguments in suppc::
such interests."

54 A.2d at 477.

The broad concept of pri vi ty has been recogr.:z:
applied by courts in factual settings similar to that c::
present case.

In Hixson v. Kansas City, 361 Mo. 1211, :;:

2d 341 (1951), the Supreme Court of Missouri found that:
of residents of Clay and Jackson Counties were precluded:
attempting to de-annex Clay County from Kansas City wne=' ·
former suit had determined the annexation to be reasor.a:.•
some residents of Clay County had intervened to cha!iec:i
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annexation.

The parties challenging the annexation were not

the same in the two suits, and no resident of Jackson County was
ir.vol ved in the former suit.

Despite these technical defects

rn the identities of the parties, the Court applied res judicata
because the interests of the parties in the two suits were
identical and both groups sought to protect the common interest.
similarly in Barrett v. City of Chicago, 11 Ill. App. 2d 146,
i.36 N.E.2d 564

(1956), res judicata principles were applied

against persons seeking to challenge a public contract who had
not been parties to a former suit, which had also challenged
the same contract.

In Campbell v. Nassau County, 192 Misc.

821, 82 N.Y.S.2d 179, aff'd,

274 App. Div. 929, 83 N.Y.S.2d

511 (1948), res judicata barred a suit challenging government

action even though some of the plaintiffs in the second suit
were different.

The court noted that the same interest was

involved and that the named plaintiffs were indistinguishable
from other potential plaintiffs.

The court concluded by

reasoning that if the new plaintiffs were not considered
to be in privity, "litigation of this character would virtually
be

interminable."

82 N.Y.S.2d at 183.

The Hixson, Barrett and Campbell cases are especially
instructive because they are factually comparable to this case.

In those cases, as in this one, certain plaintiffs sought to
litigate issues which had previously been determined against

them though they had not been parties.

In each case, the
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particular plaintiffs were indistinguishable in interei:
from previous plaintiffs with respect to the issues wh:::
been determined.

In each case, it could be said that :•,

was but one right involved, one held in common by many;:
plaintiffs.

All the prerequisites of privity which exk

in those cases exist in this one.
The Utah Supreme Court also has recognized the-.
"privity" in the context of res judicata and collateral
estoppel is broader than mere "privity of estate."

Ir.

Tanner v. Bacon, 103 Utah 494, 136 P.2d 957 (1943), the
Court stated:
This court has defined the word "privity" as "a
mutual or successive relationship to the same righ:
or property. As applied to judgments or decrees
of courts, the word means one whose interest has
been legally represented at the time."
136 P.2d at 960, quoting Glen Allen Mining Co. v. ParkGe:

Mining Co., 77 Utah 362, 296 P. 231, 233 (1931)

.!:./

The Glen Allen opinion clarifies the approach::
taken in cases such as the one at bar.
the Court noted:

After defining ?r:
'

"The ground on which persons standing

l

i: ·

to the litigating party are bound by the proceeding to wr.:.
is a party is that they are identical with him in inter_0

~

*/The Appellant's own brief on appeal admits ~~:~/~~.
adopted a broad approach to privity. Appellant's -
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P. at 233 (emphasis added).

The Court went on to explore

the particular interests of the litigating party and the
person alleged to be in privity with him with respect to the
particular issues which were litigated.

In Glen Allen, the

interests were not co-extensive.
An application of these principles of privity to the
facts of this case can only lead to the conclusion that Appellant
is one who was in privity with the plaintiffs in Suit 1 with
respect to the specific issue of the compliance of the
Millers' house to the restrictive covenant.

The restrictive

covenant represents an identical promise given by each
landowner to every other landowner in the applicable area.~
The right to enforce that covenant is a single legal right held
in common by all the prbmisee-landowners.

See Quinn v. State

ex rel. Leroy, 118 Ohio St. 48, 160 N.E. 453 (1928)
same contract was the basis for finding privity) .

(interest in
Enforcement

of the covenant against the Millers and their contractors

~/As argued under Point I above, this area consists only of
Plat F of the Northwest Subdivision, which excludes Appellant
as a party who may enforce the agreement. However, this argument
will assume that Appellant is a promisee of the covenant and
may enforce it.
It is interesting to note that Appellant, who
alleges in paragraph 17 of his complaint that he is in privity
with the Millers (and consequently the former plaintiffs), must
argue on this appeal that no privity exists between himself and
the former plaintiffs to avoid the application of collateral
estoppel.
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was undertaken by two neighbors, one of
owned property adjoining the Millers'.

h

w om, like Appe •.

Seeking injuncti'"

relief, Suit 1 necessarily would have benefited

not oni!·

these plaintiffs but every other promisee-landowner inc,,.
-

~·-.

Appellant if it had been successful.

The present suit ,
I"'··:

any other suit which could have been (or may still be)
brought, depends on a relitigation of the compliance

of~

same house with the same restrictive covenant as was invo
in Suit 1.

The existence of identical issues, interests;

representation of a common legal right constitute all of·.
elements of privity.
It is apparent that the application of collatm.
estoppel in this case would not be unfair to Appellant.

c

interest has been fully represented and his positions fuL
litigated by able counsel in Suit l.

Appellant apparenti;

does not contend otherwise, relying solely on the concept.
an absolute right to a day in court as the ground for reve'.
on this point of decision.

He does not claim to have any

new evidence to present, nor any new arguments, on the
of compliance.

!Ii.

Appellant does attempt to argue that his

right to enforce the covenant is not the same as that of
other property owners because "not all damages are ider.tic'
Appellant's Brief at 21.

But questions of damages are

even relevant to this discussion.

r.O'.

·
oi
It is on questions

liability, the only issues reached by the court in the F'
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case, that this discussion is focused, and on those issues,
the rights and interests of all the promisee-landowners and
the evidence available to any of them are identical.

In

short, Appellant's case has already been heard, and only
because the result was adverse to him does he seek to have
the issues litigated again.

It would not be unfair to deny

him the opportunity.
It is also crucial to recognize the gross unfairness to Respondents that the present situation creates.

They

have already incurred the cost and delay of two lawsuits at
the trial level and this appeal.

How many other potential

plaintiffs are waiting for their turn to bring a lawsuit to
enforce the covenant is unknown.

Unless the doctrine of

collateral estoppel has application to foreclose this and
subsequent suits on the same issues, Respondents face a
potentially unlimited number of separate lawsuits by plaintiffs
who might seek to reli tigate the issue of breach of the
restrictive covenant until they get a favorable judgment.
The costs to Respondents have already been exhorbitant--at
some point this must end!
Also, from the standpoint of conserving scarce
judicial resources, it would be unwise to set a judicial
precedent that would allow and encourage plaintiffs with
identical rights to be enforced against the same defendant
to bring suits seriatim until a favorable judgment is achieved.
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Only an application of existing privity precedents can a<.·.
such a result.

Campbell v. Nassau County, 192 Misc

• 821,'

N.Y.S.2d 179, 183 (1948).
Of course, as Appellant notes, considerations o:
judicial economy and fairness to Respondents should not t,
applied to deny potential plaintiffs their substantive
rights.

But the broad doctrine of privity as adopted by

this Court and argued in this brief, is appropriately lir:·
to protect such rights.

The doctrine does not apply merel.

because the issues are the same.

In addition, the right

being enforced must be the same, and the interests

of~

privy must be identical with those of the party to the
former suit.

Appellant reviews the facts of dozens of ca:;

which are obviously dissimilar from this case because the
rights asserted and the interests of the parties were not
the same.

Respondents do not claim that these cases, on"

facts, should have been dee ided the other way.

For exampi'

in Tanner v. Bacon, 103 Utah 494, 136 P. 2d 957 (1943)' th:'
Court properly determined that the State Engineer was not
representing the interests of certain protestors in deny!:
plaintiff's application for appropriation of water.

T~

State Engineer has statutory responsibilities that would
preclude representation or identity of interests ev~~~
the same result was sought.

The California Supreme cour:

09 P.2d 387 (19f
in Dillard v. McKnight, 34 Cal. 2d 209, 2
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o:

restated the broad definition of privity and determined that
one partner was not in privity with another where they had
been sued in their individual capacities.

And in Wolff

v. ouPuis, 233 Cr. 317, 378 P.2d 707 (1963), a non-community
property state, the Oregon Supreme Court properly held that
a husband, suing for loss of consortium, an independent
cause of action, was not in privity with his wife who had
sued earlier for personal injuries caused by the same accident.
It is obvious that examples of common rights and
identical interests are relatively rare in comparison to
examples of independent or differing rights and interests and
that the concept of privity as described in this brief will
have limited application.

But where common rights and

identical interests exist and have been represented in a
prior suit, there should be no hesitation to apply the
doctrine.

The privy's rights simply have had their day

in court.
POINT IV
THE APPLICATION OF COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL DID NOT RESULT
IN A DENIAL OF DUE PROCESS IN THIS CASE
Throughout his brief Appellant claims he has been
denied due process of law by not giving him a day in court
on the issues that have been resolved.

Specifically he

claims he had a right to notice of the action, a right to a
hearing, a right to personally control the course of litigation
-29-
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and a right to appeal.

Apparently Appellant argues tha~.

requirements of due process cannot be met unless he
was in court and litigating the issues.

Th'

h

~

ls t e Cons ti:.

simply does not require.
Of course, in any case of this type where the::
of privity is involved, the court must decide whether or.e
was not a party to a former suit will be denied a persona:
in court on issues determined in that suit.

p r 1· vies
· are ;:
1

who are affected by lawsuits but who are not entitled tc :J
or to a hearing and who have no control over i_he litigatic
and no right to appeal.

Despite these facts, privies usk

find themselves bound to the determinations of those laws'::
determinations which, more often than not, are adverse to·
privies' desires.

It is apparent that the right to a day

in court is not absolute.
The issue of privi ty was briefed and twice argue:
orally to Judge Conder below.

Because the Judge was appa:'i

uncertain as to the law of pr i vi ty and recognized that mer'
identity of issues was not a sufficient basis for applyi;.:
collateral estoppel, the rehearing argument focused partic.I
on the issue of privity.

Respondents' counsel admitted or

that if privity did not exist, collateral estoppel couldi'
be applied.

The Judge necessarily found that Appellant'"

in privity with the plaintiffs in Suit 1 to reach his coi.:·
e bound without ~.:
For Appellant to argue that he Cannot b
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personal day in court, as he does in Point I of his brief,
and to argue that a judgment can bind only parties and their
privies, as he does in Point II, is to totally miss the
issue of whether Appellant is in privity, the issue addressed
by

the court below and presently before this Court.

Nor is

it helpful to recite the facts of an almost endless number

of cases without any attempt to compare them to the circumstances
of this case.
own facts.

Each case must be decided and reviewed on its

See Glen Allen Mining Co. v. Park Galena Mining Co.,

77 Utah 362, 296 P.

231 (1931).

This is not to imply that Constitutional standards
do not apply to this case or any case where privity may be

found to exist.

Such is not the law.

The finding of privity

itself denotes a conclusion that the application of collateral
estoppel to a non-party is appropriate.
United States, 181 F.2d 419, 423
f~tors

See Bruszewski v.

(3d Cir. 1950).

Many

reflect on the appropriateness of applying collateral

estoppel including considerations of judicial economy,
fairness to the defendants who may be required to relitigate
issues, and the potential of hardship to the person who
seeks to relitigate the issues if that opportunity is denied.
The final determination on the privity issue must be fair.
See Bruszewski v. United States, supra; McFadden v. McFadden,
239 Or.

76, 396 P.2d 202, 204 (1964); Hudson Transit Corp. v.

Antonucci, 137 N.J. Law 704, 61 A.2d 180, 182

(1948)

(privity
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is "such a connection in interest with the litig t·
a ion ar,
subject matter as in reason and justice precludes
tion of the issue").

.
a re 1 i:.

It has been stated that regardless

the test for privity adopted by the court, "there can be
such privity between persons as to produce collateral es:
unless the result can be defended on principles of funda:;
fairness in the due-process sense."
317, 378 P.2d 707, 710

Wolff v. DuPuis, lJ)

(1963).

What, then, are the requirements of due proceso
must be met before a person may be considered to be in
privi ty?

We would submit that the requirements of due

process are met where a court is assured that 1) the int':
of the party and the privy are identical, 2) there is a c·
right for which vindication is sought in both suits, ar.d
the interests of the privy were in fact fully litigated;
protected by the party in the prior suit.

There is no

absolute due process requirement of notice, hearing, cor.:
of the 1 i tiga tion or appeal where a court finds those tr.r'
requirements have been met.
An analysis of the key case relied upon by AW·
to establish his absolute right to a day in court leads:
the conclusion drawn in the prior paragraph.
311 U.S.

32

In ~·

(1940), the United States Supreme court heic

that an application of collateral estoppel to the defer.a'
which prevented them from challenging the validity of a:.
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agreement restricting the use of land by racial minorities,
violated due process.

The defendants were precluded on the

theory that they were members of a class which had been
represented in a prior case in which it was determined that the
agreement was binding and effective.

The Court reasoned

that the interests of the defendants, who were Black, differed
from the interests of those who litigated the former suit
and that the defendants had not been represented in that
case.

The Court stated:
It is one thing to say that some members of
a class may represent other members in a litigation
where the sole and common interest of the class in
the litigation is either to assert a common right or
to challenge an asserted obligation.
It is quite
another to hold that all those who are free alternatively either to assert rights or to challenge them
are of a single class, so that any group merely
because it is of the class so constituted, may be
deemed adequately to represent any others of the
class in litigating their interests in either alternative.
Such a selection of representatives for
purposes of litigation, whose substantial interests
are not necessarily or even probably the same as
those whom they are deemed to represent, does not
afford that protection to absent parties which due
process requires.

311 U.S. at 44-45 (citations omitted).
Beyond the relatively narrow holding of Hansberry,
the decision affords significant latitude for state courts to
make cases binding on persons who are not actually present
for the litigation.

The Court recognized that situations

exist where all interested persons are not before the court,

-33-

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

noting specifically that
where the interests of those not joined are of
thde shame c~as~ as th~dintderests of those who are,
an w ere it is cons1 ere that the latter fa' 1
represent the former in the prosecution of th~r Y
litigation of the issues in which all have a
common interest, the court will proceed to a decree.
311 U.S. at 41-42.

While the Court was not required by:t.

facts to hold that in all such cases collateral estoppel .,
be applied to those so represented, the court set down ::.;
standard of review to be applied:
With a proper regard for divergent local
ins ti tut ions and interests, this Court is justified in saying that there has been a failure of
due process only in those cases where it cannot
be said that the procedure adopted, fairly insures
the protection of the interests of absent parties
who are to be bound by it.
311 U.S. at 42

(citations omitted).

It is clear that the requirements of the Hansber:
opinion have been met in our case.

The procedure of a heo:

at the trial level and this appeal have tested fully the:.
riety of applying collaterp.l estoppel.
are identical in the two cases.

The decisive issei

The interests of Appelia:

in this case are identical to those of the former plainti'.:
Both cases sought to assert a common legal right represe•.:,
by the same restrictive agreement to which Appellant and~
former plaintiffs are all parties.~/

*/Again, this argument assumes Appellan t
an issue argued in Point I of the brief.
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ha 5 s tandi:

This conclusion is bolstered by the United States
supreme Court decision of Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific Ry co.
v. Schendel, 270 U.S. 611

(1926).

The decision precluded a

personal representative of a railway company employee from
recovering under a federal employers' liability law where the
w~dow

of the employee had already recovered under state law.

The key issue that had been adjudicated in state court was that
the decedent had been employed in intrastate commerce, which
made the federal act inapplicable.

The Court did not expressly

rule on the ground of privity but instead relied upon the
representation of the same essential interest in the first suit.
Importantly, the precluded party had no right to notice, no right
to be heard on the issue, no opportunity to control the litigation and no right to appeal.
Rule 23 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure also
illustrates that there is no absolute right to notice or hearing.
Appellant assumes that if the first suit had been brought as
a class action, he would have had a right to notice and to
opt out.

See Appellant's Brief at 21-22.

not have been the case.

But such would

The notice and option provisions of

Rule 23(c) by their own terms apply only to Rule 23(b) (3)
type suits, where issues common to the class predominate
over individual questions.

The former case, however, would

hc.ve bee11 brought under either Rule 23 (b) (2), since it
ol'•J:1:i+:

final injunctive relief, or Rule 23 (b) (1) (A), since
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the defendants faced inconsistent standards of
Under these class actions, there is no right
opt out, and Appellant would have been bound

conduct

to notice c:
neverthele;,

CONCLUSION
Appellant's complaint requested equitable reli;:
from the court below, and equity requires a balancing of
the interests of the contending parties.

Respondents ha·:;

;-ilready been put to the expense of two separate suits ch: ..
ing the compliance of their home with the same provisior.s
the same res tr icti ve covenant.

Now Appellant argues that

the Third Judicial District Court should hear arguments'.:
the third time on this neighborhood dispute.

But of eve:.

more significance, if the Appellant's legal positions are
adopted by this Court. and extended to their logical cor:c .. ;
everyone on the North hillside of Salt Lake City who is sU::
to a similar covenant and takes from a common granter wii:
have the legal right to sue the Millers in endless succe :.
until success is achieved.

Only the six-year statute of

limitations would ultimately provide sanctuary.

T~ P~~

expense of litigation, not to men ti on the costs of cornplyl:
with a successful j udgrnent would be immense, far outweigh::
any conceivable injury to Appellant caused by the aesthe:~:
of the Millers' house.

The equities clearly favor the Rt::

dents.
If this neighborhood dispute does not end here,
it will have no end.

Fortunately, two established legal
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doctrines provide the means by which this litigation may be
First, as argued in Point I, Appellant is not

concluded.

entitled to enforce the restrictive covenant, which is
applicable only to the property in Plat "F" of the Northcrest
subdivision.

The

~_,roperty

in Plat "F" was not burdened by a

restrictive covenant before it was acquired by Northcrest
Investment Corporation.

Northcrest Investment made the

covenant applicable to all of its grantees.

Appellant was not

a grantee of Northcrest Investment at all and consequently
is not a party to the restrictive covenant applicable to the
Millers' house.

As required by Hayes v. Gibbs, 110 Utah 54,

169 P.2d 781 (1946), the Appellant must demonstrate that his
and the Millers' title derives from a common granter, who
conveyed to both (or their predecessors) subject to the same
restrictive agreement.

This Appellant cannot do.

This Court has stated "that in the construction of
uncertain or ambiguous restrictions, the courts will resolve
all doubts in favor of the free and unrestricted use of property."
(1959).

Parrish v. Richards, 8 Utah 2d 419, 336 P.2d 122, 123
The same principle should be applied in determining

who is entitled to enforce a restrictive covenant.
The second legal doctrine that provides an end to this
case is collateral estoppel, which applies because Appellant
is in privity with the plaintiffs in Suit 1.

The circumstances

of this case establish conclusively that the requirements of
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privity as set out in Glen Allen Mining Co. v. Park G
Co., 77 Utah 362, 296 P. 231
103 Utah 494, 136 P.2d 957

(1931), and Tanner v

~
Ba
'

---.::..:::.-.:..,:_·...:-£2:,

(1943), have been met.

This

doctrine of privi ty, as argued in this brief, is appropr:::
limited to assure that fairness and justice are achieved:
the requirements of due process are met.
Both of the foregoing independently sufficient ::l
of law were relied upon by the trial court in granting su.-::
judgment.

With regard to the application of these doctrb'

genuine issue of fact exists.

Consequently, the lower co~~

granting of summary judgment should be upheld and Responde::
should be awarded their costs on this appeal.
Respectfully submitted this .1 lth day of November,J
FABIAN & CLENDENIN

Thomas A. Ellison
Attorneys for Defendants·
Respondents
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-38-

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

